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Abstract
Secure signal processing is becoming a de facto model for preserving privacy.
We propose a model based on the Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) tech-
nique to mitigate security breaches. Our framework provides a method to perform
a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) on a user-specified signal. Using encryption of
individual binary values and FHE operations over addition and multiplication, we
enable a user to perform the FFT in a fixed point fractional representation in binary.
Our approach bounds the error of the implementation to enable user-selectable pa-
rameters based on the specific application. We verified our framework against test
cases for one dimensional signals and images (two dimensional signals).
1 Introduction
Security breaches are severe situations that can cause significant problems when using
cloud computing resources. This can occur because unencrypted data stored within
these resources is vulnerable to security attacks, even if the cloud computing resource
is trusted. Encrypting the data can mitigate such potential vulnerabilities. However, if
the resources are being used to perform significant computations, then encrypting the
data is not normally a possibility. Our focus is on solving the problem by the abil-
ity to process data while encrypted using Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) [5].
FHE enables a user to encrypt their data and run a prescribed process against the en-
crypted data. In this paper we will focus on secure signal processing particularly, with
performing the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) using the FHE framework.
Focusing on the overall problem, our user has a set of data that needs to be pro-
cessed on a cloud computing resource. As illustrated in Figure 1, the FHE process
involves a user (client side) using a cloud computing resource (server side). The first
step in the process is to generate keys for the encryption ((public, secret) key pair).
With this key pair, the original signal can be encrypted (step 2). The next step (3) in
the process is to transport the data from the client to server; which is not a major focus
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of this paper, except the data should be transmitted via a secure channel to minimize
exposure. Next, the encrypted process (step 4) can occur (FFT in this paper). Here
it is important to note that the processing on the server is actually developed by the
user and transported to the server (this is not shown in the diagram). Similar to step
3, step 5 involves getting the data from the server back to the client (assumed secure
connection). Finally (step 6), the encrypted processed signal can be decrypted. The
decryption results in the processed signal for the user. This process also leaves open
Figure 1: FHE in Cloud Computing: Steps to perform FHE on a cloud computing
resources from a data perspective.
the possibility of generating algorithms that are unknown to the client side. A complex
algorithm that uses an FFT would need the building block of an encrypted FFT.
Starting with the approach used by Shortell and Shokoufandeh [11], we modify
it to perform an FFT in the encrypted space. Our approach focuses on using single
binary digit encryption of fixed point values. This requires development of binary gate
processors to take binary digit computations to full byte and word processing. Once
this is done, it is possible to build an encrypted version of the FFT. This is analogous to
building a CPU and having a computer program that performs the FFT via additions,
subtractions, and multiplications.
The remainder of this paper will flow as follows. Section 2 presents the related work
to encryption and performing secure signal processing. We discuss some background
related to the FHE scheme used in Section 3. Section 4 provides the detailed discussion
on implementation of FFT. In Sections 5 and 6 we discuss the accuracy errors and our
implementation evaluation results. We provide details on Time/Space Complexities of
FFT over FHE in Section 7. Finally, we present our conclusions and future work in
Section 8.
2 Related Work
Research in secure signal processing has received increasing attention over the past
decade. Troncoso-Pastoriza and Perez-Gonzalez [12] examined secure signal process-
ing in the cloud very similar to the concept we use in our work. They focused on
privacy issues that occur with cloud computing which is ideally what a Fully Homo-
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Figure 2: Example of running FFT in encrypted domain for 2D images. The first row
shows original images, the second row is the unencrypted FFT, third row is the FFT
over FHE, and final row is the difference of the FFT results.
morphic Encryption scheme can provide. Wang et. al. [14] also considered privacy
issues with secure signal processing. Their focus was on biometrics and protecting au-
thentication and privacy. This paper is similar in keeping confidentiality of private data
in a cloud computing environment.
Other research in this field focuses on using the Paillier encryption scheme that
provides homomorphic addition and constant multiplication. But the lack of ciphertext-
ciphertext multiplication precludes this scheme from being fully homomorphic. Hsu,
Lu, and Pei [7] used this scheme to perform the Scale Invariant Feature Transform
(SIFT) in an encryption fashion. Bai et. al. [1] also used the scheme for an encrypted
SURF. There are a few other examples of using the Paillier scheme [8] [9]. While
all of these examples can be performed in the encrypted domain, they fail to be a
Fully Homomorphic Encryption. In contrast, our approach uses a Fully Homomorphic
Encryption scheme.
It is also important to note some of the recent advances in Fully Homomorphic
Encryption in the past few years. Gentry developed the original scheme in 2009 [5] [4].
The original scheme was designed for encrypting binary values and improvements over
time continued to look at time and space complexity and the ability to encrypt more
than just binary values [2] [3]. An improved scheme [6] developed a few years later is
used in this paper as a FHE tool of choice for our solution
3 Notation and Background
In this paper we use small caps to identify individual binary gates. Zq is used to repre-
sent an integer ring with a modulus of q. Letters are used for variables in error analysis
equations. For Complex variables, we will use Re and Im to represent the real and
imaginary values of a complex number.
To perform an encrypted FFT, we need the ability to encrypt and then process the
ciphertexts. We use the Fully Homomorphic Encryption scheme defined proposed by
Gentry, Sahai, and Waters [6] that provides the basic capabilities including: key gener-
ation, encryption, decryption, and evaluation. Key generation provides a public/secret
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key pair that encrypts with the public key and decrypts with the secret key. Hardness
of their scheme is based on learning with errors problem [10]; hence the secret key is
a trapdoor in the public key to extract the original plaintext. Encryption and decryp-
tion are relatively straightforward conceptual processes. It is important to note that the
ciphertexts are matrices that embed integers numbers, and the scheme can operate un-
der the Zq ring. Moving into evaluating ciphertexts, the scheme has four capabilities:
addition, constant multiplication, two ciphertext multiplication, and a NAND gate. The
first three operate over the Zq ring, but last operation is only for binary values. We also
rely on the fact the NAND gates can be combined into any other gate.
4 FFT in FHE
To implement FFT in the chosen FHE scheme, it is necessary to develop a structure
that enables using the binary NAND gate to perform encrypted additions and constant
multiplications. Since the individual ciphertexts are binary values, the additions and
multiplications are going to need to be binary gates. Additionally, we need to perform
calculations with fractional numbers given an arbitrary bit size. So the addition and
multiplication processes in binary need to account for this.
Binary addition and multiplication are computed using different binary gates mainly
XOR and AND gates. NAND gates are extremely useful because all other binary gates
can be calculated from them! This includes AND, OR, XOR, NOT, NOR, and XNOR.
Having these gates available enables generation of more complex binary processes.
Many of these gate computations are well known techniques.
Our next step is to use these binary gates and generate half and full adders. Hav-
ing half and full adders will allow for performing an arbitrary bit size addition of two
ciphertexts. Binary addition (and subtraction) is relatively straightforward. Full adders
linked to together starting from the lowest bit to the highest bit will generate the addi-
tion of two ciphertexts. Figure 3 shows how the adders are built together to perform
arbitrary bit size addition (example of eight bits). Interestingly, subtraction can be
performed by inverting the second binary values and using an initial carry bit of 1.
Figure 3: Example Adder for 8 bits including half and full adders
Next, we focus on constant multiplication and ciphertext-ciphertext multiplication.
Binary multiplication causes the doubling of size for the binary values, which is an
extremely important fact because of a two’s complement implementation of binary
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numbers. Bit extension is necessary because otherwise negative numbers will not be
calculated correctly. We used an implementation known as Wallace Trees for multipli-
cation [13] as it provides a way to arbitrarily handle different binary sizes 1. There is a
potential security concern that may be introduced by constant multiplication. Because
the constant is unencrypted, the binary values of the original constant can be partially
traced into the Wallace tree computations. This can potentially provide an attacker
knowledge about intermediary values. While this will not review the original cipher-
text, it enables the attacker to identify values that the encrypted result cannot be. For
example, if a few zeroes in the constant factor can identify a result bit to be zero, the
space of potential values of the result has been reduced. Technically this is true of just
multiplying an even constant factor because the result must be even.
At this point, we have methods to add, subtract, and multiply integers. The FFT
algorithm will require computations involving floating point numbers. Our implemen-
tation uses fixed point numbers to emulate floating point numbers. By using a fixed
point representation, we can use the integer based numbers represent floating point
numbers. This was similar to what was done in other work [11] but we improve this
by using binary digits to handle cases that the straight integer implementation can’t
handle. Using a multiplier that is a factor of 2 (based on using binary values), floating
point numbers can become fixed point numbers in an integer space. This approach in-
troduces error which we will discuss in the next section. For addition and subtraction,
fixed point implementation is easily provided that the fractional bit size is consistent
for both numbers (which we enforce). Multiplication is complicated because of the ex-
pansion in the bit size (doubling) and our solution is to extract a different set of the bits
than just the lowest x (where x is the input bit size). By extracting the middle bits of
the input size, an implicit division is occurring which provides a true implementation
of fixed point multiplication. This also solves an earlier problem that caused long term
expansion of fixed point multipliers during multiplication.
We have all the necessary building blocks required to implement FFT in the en-
crypted space. Step one of FFT is to perform a bit reversal, which is extremely easy
since the order of the points is known and can easily be modified in position without
revealing anything other than a bit reversal occurred. Step two requires calculating the
Wn multipliers and running the butterfly computations over the signal for logN iter-
ations (N logN driver). The multipliers are constants, so these can be input and used
with constant multiplication. Constant multiplication results drive the additions for the
signal points; yielding the two new points for the next iteration of the FFT. After N
iterations of signal calculations and logN iterations of the outer loop, the process will
be complete.
Theorem 1. Fast Fourier Transform can be calculated in the encrypted domain via
Fully Homomorphic Encryption.
To prove Theorem 1, we need to show that the process does in fact perform the FFT
in the encrypted domain. Following the process, we must prove that the encryption
works, the evaluation piece, and then the decryption piece.
1for brevity, we refer the reader to [13] for implementation
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A Not A
(a) NOT
A
B
A and B
(b) AND
A or B
A
B
(c) OR
A
B
A nor B
(d) NOR
A xor B
A
B
(e) XOR
A
B
A xor B
(f) XNOR
Figure 4: Binary Gate Implementations using only NAND gates
Lemma 1. The FHE scheme properly encrypts values in the fixed fractional format to
a vector of encrypted ciphertexts.
Lemma 2. The FHE scheme properly decrypts values in the fixed fractional format
from a vector of ciphertexts.
Lemma 3. The FHE scheme properly evaluates the Fast Fourier Transform for binary
vector ciphertexts of a vector of fixed fractional values.
To prove Lemma 3, we need to show that the output of each binary vector is the
same result as expected by the FFT algorithm. The key point here is that the butterfly
computations of FFT provide the correct result. As we had shown earlier, addition,
subtraction, and multiplication are needed to perform the butterfly computation. This
becomes recursive as each operation is built from binary gates and finally at the NAND
gate from the scheme itself. We start with individual lemmas for the individual gates
and move up to three main operations. We assume the NAND gate is working as part of
these lemmas. Theorem 3 of [6] proves the working of the FHE scheme basics (include
Lemmas 1 and 2).
Lemma 4. Given the NAND gate of the FHE scheme works, the FHE scheme properly
performs a NOT, AND, OR, and XOR gates.
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Proof. Previous research [15] has shown that a NAND gate can be used to generate
all other logic gates including NOT, AND, OR, and XOR (which are important to this
paper). Examples of the logic gates are shown in Figure 4. Because the FHE scheme
can compute a NAND gate, therefore we know the framework will correctly compute
the remaining logic gates.
2We omit NOR and XNOR because they are not used for FFT.
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With Lemmas for the individual binary gates, we can create Lemmas for the half
and full adders. Having the individual Lemmas will make the proofs significantly
easier.
Lemma 5. Given that a XOR and AND gate are available in the FHE scheme, the FHE
scheme properly calculates a half adder.
Proof. From Figure 3, we have the half adder structure in the bottom right hand corner.
We are not proving the half adder itself is right, but proving that it is correctly calculated
by the FHE scheme via the gates, which is true because of the Lemmas 4.
Lemma 6. Given that an OR gate and a half adder are available in the FHE scheme,
the FHE scheme properly calculates the full adder.
Proof. Reviewing the inset in Figure 3, we know the full adder is built from two half
adders and an OR gate (again not proving a full adder structure is correct). Lemma 4
proved the OR gate works. Lemma 5 proved a single half adder works. By construction,
following the correct paths provides a full adder capability.
It is now time to move on to addition and subtraction.
Lemma 7. Given the binary gate and adder capabilities of the FHE scheme, the FHE
scheme properly calculates arbitrary bit addition and subtraction of integers and fixed
fractional format.
Proof. Proving the scheme can correctly calculate addition and subtraction requires
proving the binary result is correct. Since the algorithm is the same for both integers
and the fixed fractional format, proving one proves both. We have the basic algorithm
for adding and subtracting binary numbers and it is know to comprise a set of full
adders. Lemma 6 proves the scheme can calculate a full adder correctly. Given this,
we have proved that the addition and subtraction of ciphertexts occurs correctly in our
FHE scheme.
Our next two lemmas are related to multiplication. Our first lemma will involve
proving multiplication works for simple integer numbers including truncating the high
order bits. The second lemma focuses on fixed fractional format and obtaining the
correct resulting value. An interesting note at this point because of the lemma is that
binary division could actually be implemented but was not because it was not needed
for FFT; however a single division is needed to support the fixed fractional format.
Lemma 8. Given AND gates and half and full adders, the FHE scheme properly cal-
culates integer multiplication via Wallace Trees.
Proof. Starting off, we know that the Wallace Trees correctly calculate integer multi-
plication of binary values. To prove our scheme calculates multiplication of two binary
integers correctly, we need to show that we can correctly compute the Wallace Trees.
Wallace Trees are built from a set of AND gates, followed by combinations of half and
full adders. All three of these correctly compute binary values in our scheme based
on our previous lemmas. The final importance of the proof is to show both positive
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and negative can be correctly calculated. This can be done easily by bit extending the
binary values to twice the original size. Finally, we drop the higher order bits to keep
the binary values size at their original size. Therefore, our scheme correctly calculates
integer multiplication in the encrypted domain.
Lemma 9. Given AND gates and half and full adders, the FHE scheme properly cal-
culates fixed fractional format multiplication via Wallace Trees.
Proof. We start with the fact that we can assume to have AND gate, half adder and
a full adder that correctly compute there binary values in FHE. From Lemma 8, our
scheme will properly calculate integer multiplication, which is part of our fixed frac-
tional format. In a fixed number format, we need to divide the scaling factor out of the
multiplied values, which is 2n of the previous size. Because we forced the multiplier to
be a power of two, division is a simple bit shift. This is easy in our FHE scheme to drop
the lower and higher order bits (extract the middle bits). Thus, the scheme calculates
the fixed fractional format multiplication.
Using the above lemmas and their respective proofs, we can prove the evaluation
lemma (3) which is the key butterfly computation of the FFT; without which the cor-
rectness of computations for FFT in encryption domain cannot be proven to be correct.
Proof. Remembering the two parts of the FFT, first is the bit reversal and then the but-
terfly computations. The bit reversal does not need to occur in the encrypted domain so
this process works correctly as before. As the butterfly computations are processed in a
loop and the loop processing is not encrypted, proving that the butterfly computations
can be calculated in the encrypted domain will prove that the FFT can be calculated
using FHE.
Simply, the butterfly computation is a pair of equations of complex numbers. Equiv-
alently, there are six real number equations to calculate. These equations are a com-
bination of addition, subtraction, and multiplication (via constant values). Lemmas 7
and 9 proved that the FHE scheme correctly calculates addition, subtraction, and mul-
tiplication of encrypted fixed fractional values. Because of this, we can calculate the
butterfly computations and properly calculate the FFT.
Finally we can prove Theorem 1.
Proof. To prove that FFT can be calculated via an FHE method, we focused on three
pieces in the FHE scheme: Encryption, Evaluation, and Decryption. We have used
three individual lemmas to prove that each one of these pieces is correctly computed in
FHE (Lemmas 1, 3, and 2). Because we have proved the entire process works, we have
proved the FFT can be computed in the encrypted domain using our FHE scheme.
5 Error Analysis
Having discussed the implementation of FFT using FHE, we turn our attention to esti-
mating the error. Our only source of error is the conversion of floating point numbers
to fixed point numbers. While initially this might not be a major problem, over time the
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calculations will lose accuracy. Immediately, we know that there will be dependencies
on the number of points in the signal because of the dependency on the size with the
number of iterations.
We start with building up the bounds of the error introduced by the fixed point rep-
resentation. There will some initial error caused by truncation when moving to fixed
point representation. Following that, the main computation is the two point butter-
fly, which involves a complex point multiplication and an addition. We complete this
section with a proof on the error bound for the entire FFT in FHE.
Lemma 10. For a multiplication involving two complex points (a+ bi, c+ di) with an
error of ∆, (0 ≤ ∆ < 1) in each of the real and imaginary components, the error in
the resultant is bounded by:
(∆ (a+ c− b− d) ,∆(a+ b+ c+ d)) . (1)
Proof. Our two initial points are:
(a+∆, b+∆) (2)
(c+∆, d+∆) (3)
Multiplying these together yields,
((a+∆) · (c+∆)− (b+∆) · (d+∆) ,
(b+∆) · (c+∆) + (a+∆) · (d+∆)) (4)
As we expand the factors, we will drop terms of ∆2 as these will not be the primary
source of error in our final equations (because ∆ < 1).
(a · d+∆ · (a+ c)− (b · d+∆ · (b + d)) ,
b · c+∆ · (b+ c) + a · d+∆ · (a+ d)) (5)
Continuing to combine terms,
(a · d− b · d+∆ · (a+ c− b− d),
b · c+ a · d+∆ · (b+ c+ a+ d)) (6)
This provides errors in the real and imaginary components as:
(∆ · (a+ c− b− d),
∆ · (b+ c+ a+ d)) (7)
Next, we examine the error for a single butterfly computation. The original FFT
equation is:
Xi = xi +Wn ∗ xj . (8)
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Lemma 11. For a single butterfly computation, the error is bounded by
∆ · (Re(Wn) + Im(Wn) + Re(xj) + Im(xj) + 1) (9)
for a single butterfly computation of a single point where ∆ is the original error.
Proof. We start with the butterfly computation equation for a single point:
Xi = xi +Wn · xj (10)
Then adding ∆ to each of the terms:
Xi = xi +∆+ (Wn +∆) · (xj +∆) (11)
Lemma 10 provides the bound on the error for the right hand side of the equation. Then
there is only addition of another ∆ in both real and imaginary parts. This yields:
∆ · (Re(Wn) + Re(xj)− Im(Wn)− Im(xj) + 1)
∆ · (Re(Wn) + Re(xj) + Im(Wn) + Im(xj) + 1) (12)
On the second half of the butterfly computations, the signs of the real and imaginary
values are flipped (the one is always positive).
The previous two lemmas help us bound the overall error of the FFT by estimating
the error accumulated over time. The most important item about the butterfly computa-
tions is that they reduce an O(N2) algorithm to a O(N logN) algorithm. This means
the resulting value the FFT for a single point is a O(N2)-based value that only uses
O(N logN) computations. This helps bound the error from above: the summation of
all signal points and the Wn values. But because we perform less computations, the
value can be bounded lower.
Theorem 2. For performing FFT in FHE, the error introduced by the processing is
bounded by:
∆ ·
N
2
(logN +Xb + 1) , (13)
where ∆ is the original representation, WS (used in proof) is a sum of all Wn that
appear in the FFT for a given size N , and Xb is a bound on the size of the signal
points.
Proof. Using Lemma 11, we know after a single butterfly for a value the error is:
∆ · (Re(Wn) + Re(xj)− Im(Wn)− Im(xj) + 1) ,
∆ · (Re(Wn) + Re(xj) + Im(Wn) + Im(xj) + 1) . (14)
After the second iteration of the outer loop of FFT, the Wn will be unchanged but the
xjs will have additional values (and error). The key point here is what is being added
to the error over time. It is actually the real and imaginary components of the signal
points. This tells us at the second iteration, we have added up all Wn plus a number
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of terms from each xj seen so far, and an equivalent number of ones from the xi sides.
After the logN iterations, each point will have the following error contributions:
∆ ·

 ∑
Wn∈W
Wn +
∑
evenj
xj +
N
2

 , (15)
where we have used W to represent the set of Wn. Since each Wn is a known constant
for a given N , we will call this sum bound as WS . Additionally, we know that we
can assume a bound on each xj without loss of generality. Calling this value Xb and
knowing there are N
2
of them, we can update the bound as:
∆ ·
(
WS +
N
2
(Xb + 1)
)
(16)
An equivalent view on WS parameter is that the Wn absolute values are less than one,
which means WS is bounded by the number of times any Wn enters an equation (i.e.,
N logN
2
) resulting in a total error of
∆ ·
(
N
2
(logN +Xb + 1)
)
. (17)
This provides some different results than [11]. In particular, the error dependents
on the total number of points, which in turn means that the error will increase as the size
of the signal increases. So when choosing a multiplier with the fixed fractional format,
the signal size will matter. This is a good place to remember that an FHE scheme can
evaluate ciphertexts indefinitely by refreshing ciphertexts (see [5] and [6] for details).
6 Experimental Results
To verify our implementation works, we ran random signals against the FFT in FHE
and compared the results to an unencrypted standard version FFT. Our main focus is
to measure the error introduced by our implementation and verify Theorem 2 is valid.
We used signal sizes of 8, 16, 32, 64, and 128 complex data signals. Additionally, we
constrained the signal to be values in the range [0, 1] similar to what many real world
signals operate in. In the encrypted domain, we work in a 32-bit binary space and 16-
bit fractional space. This means we limit our non-fractional integer size to 16-bits and
we are using a multiplier of 65536. Having a multiplier of 65536 is useful since it will
provide numerical accuracy up to 1/65536 ≈ 1.5259e− 5. As we saw in the previous
section, we will not be containing the entire set of values in this space because over
time the processing will lose accuracy (particularly in multiplication).
It is important to look at measured error introduced as a whole for given signals.
Our main focus is to make sure we can constrain the error. When comparing individual
values between the unencrypted and encrypted results, we can calculate the total error
sum of all points (2n from n complex points). We also calculate the mean error across
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the points along with the variance and standard deviation. Table 1 shows the results
of the measured error from the random testing. One of the key aspects of the results
is that the average error per point is slowly rising upwards above zero but is staying
in the 10−5 range. This is expected as the error is dependent on the total number of
points in the signal. Considering our accuracy of 1/65536 and that the signal size is a
multiplicative factor as well, experimentally the error is contained below the bounding
from the previous section.
Table 1: Measured Error in One Dimensional Tests
Complex Total Average Standard
Point Size Error Error Variance Deviation
8 pt 0.0207 1.294e-5 8.208e-11 9.060e-06
16 pt 0.0709 2.216e-5 2.434e-10 1.560e-05
32 pt 0.258 4.199e-5 1.714e-09 4.140e-05
64 pt 1.030 8.383e-5 4.400e-09 6.633e-05
128 pt 4.437 1.81e-4 2.856e-08 1.69e-04
Finally, we tested our configuration using 16× 16 images (10 total images; shown
in Figure 2). This provided a two dimensional test of the FFT over FHE in the mul-
tidimensional case. We calculated the same values in the one dimensional case. The
total error was 0.311 which led to an average error of 6.067 × 10−5. This equates to
a variance of 5.558 × 10−9 and a standard deviation of 7.455 × 10−5. These values
show our framework contains the error within bounds.
7 Time/Space Complexities
FHE schemes are known to be computationally intensive. Encrypting a single value
plaintext generates a two dimensional matrix in the ciphertext space. A NAND gate
in the FHE scheme is an O(N3) process (matrix-matrix multiplication). This can be
partially reduced by using parallelization techniques (GPU processing is real potential
here). Focusing on FFT, which is an O(M logM) process, we need to understand the
number of gates that can processed in total. M logM is the number of addition and
multiplication gates being processed in total. A fixed point addition process is 36 ∗ F
NAND gates, where F is the size of fixed point size and 36 comes from the nand gates in
the F sequential full adders. A fixed point multiplication process is 288F 2 logF NAND
gates. 4F AND gates for the first step and worst case assumed full adders for the logF
process. This second process is for 2F full adders. It should be noted that this bound
is worst case and can be significantly tighten because Wallace trees do not need to run
full adders at each step. Combining these calculations yields an asymptotic running
time of O(M logMF 2 logFN3 with constants removing, where we have used M to
be the number of data points in the FFT, F to be the fixed point binary size, and N to
be ciphertext size.
Coming back to the space complexity, we know a ciphertext text has N2 space
(matrix). We will set the size of the signal to be L, ie the total amount of data points in
the signal whether single or multi-dimensional. Each data point has a set of F binary
values. Multiplying these together yield: O(LFN2) space complexity. In both cases,
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these are extremely high complexities (especially compared to unencrypted process-
ing).
8 Conclusion
Having shown that we can perform the Fast Fourier Transform in the encrypted domain,
we are now able to expand the capabilities of the FHE framework to target additional
signal processing algorithms and other potential image processing algorithms like SIFT
and SURF. There are other open issues with FHE. One major open item is that the FHE
processing takes significant amount of time because of the matrix-matrix multiplication
required for the underlying processing. Being able to improve computational perfor-
mance of the FHE processing would contribute significantly to making FHE a viable
solution in real world computing.
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